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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

:

JEFF RAY HARRIS,

CaseNo.20020085-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (Supp. 2002), where this is an appeal from an interlocutory order
entered in a court of record in a criminal case. Appellant Jeff Ray Harris petitioned for
appeal from an interlocutory order of the trial court, entered on January 16, 2002. This
Court granted the petition on April 29,2002. (R. 178-79.) A copy of the trial court's
January 16, 2002 Order is attached as Addendum A, and a copy of this Court's April 29,
2002 Order granting the petition for permission to appeal from an interlocutory order is
attached as Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue presented for review is as follows: Whether the trial court erred when it
ruled that it had an incomplete record of the preliminary hearing, and also, whether it
erred when it ordered further evidentiary proceedings for the preliminary hearing.

Standard of Review: The issue on review concerns an interpretation of a rule of
law, and the bindover proceedings. This Court will interpret a rule of law without deference to the trial court. State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108,ffljlO-11, 992 P.2d 986. It also will
review a bindover issue as a question of law. State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, T|8, 20 P.3d 300.
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
The issue is preserved in the record on appeal at 44-45; 63-108; 131-39; 192.
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following provisions will be determinative of the issue on appeal: Utah R.
Crim. P. 7 (2002); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-401; 76-6-403; 76-6-404; 76-6-405 (1999).
The text of those provisions is contained in the attached Addendum C.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below.
In November 2000, the state filed an Information against Defendant Jeff Ray
Harris (which was later amended), alleging one count of theft under Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-404 (1999). (R. 2-4; 31-33.) On April 12, 2001, the Honorable Denise Lindberg
held a preliminary hearing in the matter (R. 29-30; 191), and bound Harris' case over for
pretrial proceedings. (R. 29-30.) Thereafter, Harris filed a Motion to Quash, and the
case was transferred to the Honorable Leslie Lewis. (R. 34-35; 44-45; 46-48; 50-53; 63108; 131-39.)
On November 28, 2001, Judge Lewis considered the Motion to Quash and ruled on
2

the matter as follows: Judge Lewis indicated she was inclined to grant the Motion to
Quash. However, she determined she had an incomplete record of the preliminary
hearing. (R. 192:Tab 1:3-8; see infra note 1, herein.) Judge Lewis then entered an order
for an evidentiary hearing to supplement the preliminary-hearing transcript. (Id.)
On December 19, the defense filed a Motion to Reconsider, urging Judge Lewis (i)
to accept the record presented to her from the preliminary hearing, (ii) to strike that
portion of the order providing for a supplemental evidentiary hearing, and (iii) to grant
the Motion to Quash. (R. 150-54.) On January 16, 2002, the trial judge entered an order
reiterating the earlier ruling (R. 163), and this Court granted Harris' petition for
permission to appeal from an interlocutory order. (R. 178-79.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The state charged Harris with theft. At a preliminary hearing, the state presented
the following evidence.
Kristine Praag testified that her family lived in a new home in Salt Lake County.
(R. 191:1; see also R. 191:14 (testimony of Eric Praag).) She was involved in building
the home and was approached by Harris to bid on cabinets for the home. (R. 191:1-2.)
Mrs. Praag informed Harris that "we already had placed the contract with another
company and [] we were probably going to go with them." (R. 191:2.) Harris asked if he
could "at least" submit a bid, and Mrs. Praag agreed to let him. (R. 19:2.)
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On May 3, 2000, Harris submitted a bid to install cabinets with cherry wood facing
throughout the home for the price of $14,100. (R. 191:3.) The Praags agreed to the terms
and entered into a contract with Harris. (R. 191:3, 14-15.) Harris requested half of the
money up front, and according to Mrs. Praag, he was to complete the work by July 21,
2000. (R. 191:3.)
Later that month, on or about May 17, Mrs. Praag contacted Harris and expressed
concern with his ability to do the work. (R. 191:4.) Harris told her not to worry. (R.
191:4-5.) Mrs. Praag testified that Harris "blew it off," and he assured her that the
cabinets would be ready on schedule. Shortly thereafter, Harris told Mrs. Praag that the
cabinets were "a third of the way done." (Id.)
On July 13, Mrs. Praag met with Harris and he admitted that he had not started the
work on the cabinets. (R. 191:6.) When Mrs. Praag asked about the money they had
given to Harris, he told them he spent it. (R. 191:6.) On July 14, the Praags terminated
the contract with Harris, as set forth in a letter that stated in sum the following:
The letter basically says that we felt at that time that Mr. Harris [had] stolen our
money, and that he is to repay the money by July 21st. And if- at that time, Mr.
Harris told us that he was not able to pay the money back by July 21st. And said, if
you can just give me more time, I promise I will pay you back. And we said, okay,
we are willing to work with you, you know, we just, we want you to do the right
thing. And so we went ahead and scratched out on this original copy that he didn't
need to pay us back by the 21st, that we would extend that until August 18th when
the time to pay the other cabinet contractor came due. Because we knew we had
30 days at least to pay this other contractor that we had to (R. 191:7-8.)
4

At approximately that point in the proceedings, the recording equipment for the
preliminary hearing malfunctioned. (See R. 191:8.) Thus, Mrs. Praag's remaining direct
examination and cross examination were not recorded. As a result, defense counsel and
the prosecutor stipulated that Mrs. Praag testified to the following additional facts at the
preliminary hearing (hereinafter the "Stipulated Facts"):
1) Mr. Harris did not pay the Praags the $7,000 he had agreed to refund.
2) The contract entered into between the Praags and Mr. Harris provided for a $50
"late penalty" against Mr. Harris after July 21st if delay on the part of Mr. Harris
caused delay in closing on the Praags' house.
(R. 61-62.) The recording equipment apparently became operational again.
Next, Kim Brown testified for the state. She was the general contractor / builder
for the Praag home. (R. 191:8-9.) On May 10,2000, Brown prepared a check in the
amount of $7,000 for Harris. (R. 191:10-11.) Brown instructed Harris not to cash the
check until there were funds in the account. On May 15, Brown gave Harris permission
to deposit the check. (Id.) Brown testified that it is not out of the ordinary for a
subcontractor to ask for a portion of the payment up front. (R. 191:13.)
Finally, Glenn Williams of Sandy City Police testified. Williams was contacted by
the Praags because, f,[t]hey were having cabinets built, had paid a substantial sum of
money to a contractor to build those. When he did not fulfill that part of the contract,
they were unable to get the money back, so they thought it was a theft." (R. 191:16.)
Williams investigated the matter and contacted Harris on October 25. (R. 191:17.)
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During the investigation, Williams asked if Harris had actually started work on the
cabinets. Harris told him that he had started the work, but now, he was using some of the
wood "on another job after [the Praags]firedhim, and that once he had the other job
finished, he would have the money to pay them back." (R. 191:18.)
Harris provided Williams with the names of two companies where he had
purchased supplies for cabinets: "Hardwoods Inc. Utah" and "Intermountain Wood
Products" in St. George. (R. 191:18.) Williams contacted those companies and obtained
invoices from them. (R. 191:19-23.) He testified that the invoices failed to reflect an
order for cherry wood. (R. 191:21 -23.)
At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Lindberg bound the case over for trial on
the charge of theft. (R. 191:27.) Thereafter, counsel for the defense filed a Motion to
Quash (R. 34-35; 44-45; 63-108; 131-39), and the case was transferred to Judge Lewis.
Judge Lewis held a hearing on the Motion to Quash and stated she was inclined to grant
the motion. The judge also stated she had an incomplete record of the preliminary
hearing due to a malfunction in the recording equipment. (R. 192: Tab 1:3.)
When defense counsel informed the judge that the parties considered the record to
be complete, the judge indicated she wanted to observe the demeanor of the witnesses
herself, and she ordered an evidentiary hearing to supplement the preliminary-hearing
transcript. The judge in essence rejected the "Stipulated Facts." (R. 192: Tab 1:3-5.)
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Harris filed a Motion to Reconsider. The trial judge then issued an order that
stated the following:
Defendant's argument on the defendant's Motion to Quash the bindover was heard
on November 28, 2001. The transcript of the Preliminary Hearing was provided,
however, it is incomplete due to technical difficulties during the hearing. The
State and the defendant have stipulated to the testimony which was absent from the
transcript, and provided that stipulation to the Court. The Court is not satisfied
that the evidence presented supports the bindover, and will hear the live testimony
which was not recorded in the transcript, along with any other live testimony the
State would like to present. The Court will rely on the live testimony presented
and the transcript from the Preliminary Hearing. The case will not be remanded
to Judge Lindberg.
(R. 163 (emphasis added).)1

1 To the extent there is confusion as to whether Judge Lewis granted the Motion to
Quash, the record reflects the following: Judge Lewis initially indicated that she was
inclined to grant the Motion. (R. 192: Tab 1:3.) She also made reference to an
incomplete record (id. (Judge Lewis stated the facts were deficient due to an incomplete
record)), "omissions" in the record (R. 192: Tab 1:4), and "the [paucity] of the full
record." (R. 192: Tab 1:5.) Thus, it seems Judge Lewis was inclined to grant the Motion
because she believed she did not have a complete record of the preliminary hearing.
After Judge Lewis made her initial ruling, counsel for Harris filed a Motion to
Reconsider, and advised the court that the record for the preliminary hearing was
complete. (R. 150-55) Counsel then asked the court to "rule on the Motion to Quash
based solely on the evidence before the court at this point." (R. 154.) The state
responded by also asking the trial court to rule on the Motion to Quash. (R. 166-67 ("the
record presented is [as] complete as possible").)
Judge Lewis then entered a subsequent order, dated January 16, 2002. That order
did not indicate whether the court would grant the Motion to Quash. Rather, the court
ordered supplemental proceedings, and it ruled it would rely on the "live testimony" and
the preliminary hearing transcript in determining the matter. (R. 163.) In essence, the
court was rejecting the "Stipulated Facts" as prepared by counsel. Harris is appealing
from that ruling.
7

Harris requested that this Court review the ruling of the trial court. (Petition for
Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order, dated February 1,2002.) This Court
granted Harris' request. (See Addendum B, hereto.) Additional facts related to this
appeal are set forth below.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In considering a motion to quash the bindover, the trial court in this case indicated
it was inclined to grant the motion; it also determined the record for the preliminary
hearing was incomplete. The trial court in essence rejected the "Stipulated Facts" of
record, and then ordered another evidentiary hearing to supplement the original
proceedings. The trial court specified that the state would be able to present any evidence
it would like at the supplemental hearing, and the court would make credibility
determinations with respect to the witnesses and the evidence. The trial court's ruling
was in error for several reasons.
First, the trial court had a complete record of the preliminary hearing: it was not at
liberty to reject the "Stipulated Facts." The Utah Supreme Court has specified that a court
is bound by party stipulations unless specified conditions have been met. The specified
conditions were not in issue here. The trial court should have accepted the "Stipulated
Facts" as part of the complete record, and ruled on the Motion to Quash.
Next, according to Utah law, in considering a motion to quash, a trial court may
not make credibility determinations with respect to the evidence. The court may only
8

assess whether a case was properly bound over to the trial court for further proceedings.
In that regard, the trial court's order here to supplement the proceedings was improper.
Also, the trial court's order for a supplemental evidentiary hearing served to
circumvent the standards set forth in State v. Brickev. 714 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah 1986).
According to Brickev, the state may be entitled to further proceedings at the preliminaryhearing stage if the prosecutor is able to show that "new or previously unavailable
evidence has surfaced or that other good cause justifies refiling." Id. Due process
considerations and fundamental fairness preclude further proceedings unless that
showing has been made. In this case, the state failed to make the requisite showing.
Thus, it was not entitled to a supplemental evidentiary hearing.
Finally, this Court should remand the case in order that the trial court may assess
the evidence set forth in the preliminary hearing transcript together with the "Stipulated
Facts" to determine whether probable cause existed for the bindover. In the event this
Court determines to make that assessment itself, it should find that the evidence here is
insufficient. The state failed to establish that Harris obtained "unauthorized control"
over the Praags' funds for "theft," and it failed to establish deception. Thus, the
information should be dismissed.

9

ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE HAD A COMPLETE RECORD OF THE
PRELIMINARY HEARING. IT ERRED WHEN IT REJECTED THE
"STIPULATED FACTS." AND WHEN IT ENTERED AN ORDER TO
SUPPLEMENT THE PRELIMINARY-HEARING TRANSCRIPT WITH
ANY TESTIMONY THE STATE WISHED TO PRESENT.
A. THE RECORD OF THE PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS COMPLETE.
1. The Court Was Bound bv the "Stipulated Facts."
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that "[o]rdinarily, courts are bound by
stipulations between parties." First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel &
Assocs.. 600 P.2d 521, 527 (Utah 1979).
An exception to that rule is when the parties have stipulated to an interpretation of
the law. Courts will not be bound by such an interpretation. Adkins v. Uncle Bart's.
Inc.. 2000 UT 14,11(34-40,1 P.3d 528 (ruling that court is not bound by stipulations
between parties when points of law requiring judicial determinations are involved; here,
court could not be bound by parties' stipulation that Dramshop Act provided a cause of
action for wrongful death), cert, denied. 531 U.S. 1011 (2000); Moonev v. GR and
Assoc. 746 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (recognizing parties cannot stipulate
to points of law).
Also, a court may set aside a stipulation only when the following conditions have
been met: a party has requested relief from the stipulation by filing a timely motion with
the court showing justifiable cause for the relief, or showing that the stipulation was
10

entered into inadvertently. If the court grants the relief, it must state its basis for doing
so. See Yeargin, Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission. 2001 UT
11,1(21,20 P.3d 287. Where the standard for withdrawing a stipulation is not met, the
trial court is bound by the stipulation. It is not at liberty to reject it.
In Dove v. Cude. 710 P.2d 170 (Utah 1985), the plaintiff obtained a default
judgment against defendants after defendants failed to respond to plaintiffs defective
complaint and summons. Defendants sought to have the judgment set aside, but were
unsuccessful. When the defendants indicated an intent to appeal the trial court's ruling,
the plaintiff filed a stipulation "agreeing to have the default judgment set aside and the
case set for trial." IdL at 171. Five months after the stipulation was filed, the plaintiff
moved to withdraw it. The trial court granted that request over the objection of the
defendants. IcL The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling and reiterated
that courts are bound by stipulations between parties. IcL Also, parties are bound by
such stipulations unless they obtain timely and proper relieffromthe court. Id. at 171.
The rule of law as it relates to party stipulations applies here, as further explained
below. See infra, subpart B., below.
2. The Standards and Rules Applicable to Preliminary Hearings.
Rule 7, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides in relevant part the following:
(g)(1) If a defendant is charged with a felony, the defendant shall be advised of the
right to a preliminary examination. If the defendant waives the right to a
preliminary examination, and the prosecuting attorney consents, the magistrate
11

shall order the defendant bound over to answer in the district court.
(2) If the defendant does not waive a preliminary examination, the magistrate shall
schedule the preliminary examination. The examination shall be held within a
reasonable time, but not later than ten days if the defendant is in custody for the
offense charged and not later than 30 days if the defendant is not in custody.
These time periods may be extended by the magistrate for good cause shown. A
preliminary examination may not be held if the defendant is indicted.
(h)(1) Unless otherwise provided, a preliminary examination shall be held under
the rules and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The state has
the burden of proof and shall proceed first with its case. At the conclusion of the
statefs case, the defendant may testify under oath, call witnesses, and present
evidence. The defendant may also cross-examine adverse witnesses.
(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe that the crime
charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, the
magistrate shall order, in writing, that the defendant be bound over to answer in the
district court. The findings of probable cause may be based on hearsay in whole or
in part. Objections to evidence on the ground that it was acquired by unlawful
means are not properly raised at the preliminary examination.
(3) If the magistrate does notfindprobable cause to believe that the crime
charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it, the magistrate
shall dismiss the information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may
enterfindingsof fact, conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal The
dismissal and discharge do not preclude the state from instituting a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense.
(i) At a preliminary examination, the magistrate, upon request of either party, may
exclude witnesses from the courtroom and may require witnesses not to converse
with each other until the preliminary examination is concluded. On the request of
either party, the magistrate may order all spectators to be excluded from the
courtroom.
(j)(l) If the magistrate orders the defendant bound over to the district court, the
magistrate shall execute in writing a bind-over order and shall transmit to the clerk
of the district court all pleadings in and records made of the proceedings before the
magistrate, including exhibits, recordings, and any typewritten transcript.
12

Utah R. Crim. P. 7 (2002) (emphasis added).
With respect to the "magistrate's role" in a preliminary hearing, the Utah Supreme
Court has stated the following:
"[T]he magistrate's role in evaluating th[e] evidence is limited.... '[T]he
magistrate should view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution
and resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution.' State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d
435, 438 (Utah 1998) (quoting State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah
1995))."
State v. Hawatmeh. 2001 UT 51, Tf3, 26 P.3d 223. That is, "'[w]hen faced with conflicting evidence, the magistrate may not sift or weigh the evidence . . . but must leave
those tasks "to the fact finder at trial.'"" State v. Clark. 2001 UT 9, U10,20 P.3d 300
(cites omitted).
Also, "the magistrate's evaluation of credibility at a preliminary hearing is limited
to determining that '"evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to
prove some issue which supports the [prosecution's] claim.'"" Talbot. 972 P.2d at 438
(quoting Pledger. 896 P.2d at 1229; Cruz v. Montova. 660 P.2d 723, 729 (Utah 1983)).
The trial court may not weigh the evidence and the court is precluded from evaluating the
weight of otherwise credible evidence. Talbot. 972 P.2d at 438.
"Additionally, '"[u]nless the evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of
reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the [prosecution's] claim," the
magistrate should bind the defendant over for trial.'" Talbot. 972 P.2d at 438 (cites
omitted). To be clear, the magistrate's role in the process "'while limited, is not that of a
13

rubber stamp for the prosecution . . . Even with this limited role, the magistrate must
attempt to ensure that all "groundless and improvident prosecutions" are ferreted out no
later than the preliminary hearing.9" Clark. 2001 UT 9, TflO (cites omitted).
The Utah Supreme Court also has recognized the inherent authority of a district
court judge to assess bindover proceedings, via a motion to quash. The purpose of the
motion to quash is to allow the district court judge to determine whether jurisdiction has
been properly invoked.
A magistrate issues a bindover order after a preliminary hearing upon finding that
there is probable cause to believe the defendant has committed the crime charged
in the information. See Utah R.Crim.P. 7(8)(b). By the bindover order, the
magistrate requires the defendant "to answer [the information] in the district
court." Id. The information is then transferred to the district court, permitting that
court to take original jurisdiction of the matter. At that point, the district court has
the inherent authority and the obligation to determine whether its original
jurisdiction has been properly invoked. In doing so, the district court need show
no deference to the magistrate's legal conclusion, implicit in the bindover order,
that the matter may proceed to trial in district court, but may conduct its own
review of the order.
State v. Humphrey. 823 P.2d 464, 465-66 (Utah 1991) (note omitted); s_ee_ also id. at 466
n.3. In this case, the standards identified above apply. See infra, subpoint B., below.
Next, with respect to the state's role in a preliminary hearing, the Utah Supreme
Court has stated the following:
At a preliminary hearing, "the State must show 'probable cause1... by fpresent[ing]
sufficient evidence to establish that "the crime charged has been committed and
that the defendant has committed it."'" Clark, 2001 UT 9 atfflflO-11,20 P.3d 300
(clarifying the question of what constitutes sufficient evidence to support a
finding of probable cause at a preliminary hearing) (quoting State v. Pledger, 896
P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995) (quoting Utah R.Crim. P. 7(h)(2))). To prevail at
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this stage, the prosecution must:
produce believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged, just
as it would have to do to survive a motion for a directed verdict.
However, unlike a motion for a directed verdict, this evidence need not be
capable of supporting a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Instead,... the quantum of evidence necessary to support a bindover is less
than that necessary to survive a directed verdict motion.
Clark 2001 UT 9 at Ifij 15-16, 20 P.3d 300 (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
Recently, in State v. Clark, we specified that at the preliminary hearing stage, the
magistrate should apply the same probable cause standard as that applied at the
arrest warrant stage. See id at ^f 16. Under this standard, "the prosecution must
present sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been
committed and that the defendant committed it." Id. [citing State v. Anderson, 612
P.2d 778, 783-84 (Utah 1980)] (emphasis added).
Hawatmeh. 2001 UT 51,fflfl4-15(footnote omitted). Those standards also apply here, as
further explained below. See infra, subpart B., below.
B. THE TRIAL COURT ESSENTIALLY REJECTED THE "STIPULATED
FACTS." THAT WAS IMPROPER. IN ADDITION. THE TRIAL COURT
IMPROPERLY RULED THAT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING SHOULD BE
SUPPLEMENTED WITH ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE.
In this case, the state charged Harris with theft. (R. 2-4; 31-33.) After the preliminary hearing, Judge Lindberg found probable cause to bind the matter over for trial.
(R. 29-30.) The defense then prepared a Motion to Quash for filing with the district court
judge. (R. 34-35; 63-108.) In connection with preparing that motion, the parties learned
that the recording equipment for the preliminary hearing malfunctioned during Mrs.
Praag's testimony. The prosecutor and defense counsel prepared a set of "Stipulated
Facts" for the court to constitute a complete record of the evidence presented at the
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preliminary hearing. (R. 61-62.)
The defense presented the Motion to Quash to Judge Lewis. After argument on
the matter, Judge Lewis stated she was inclined to grant the motion. However, she
believed she had an incomplete record of the preliminary hearing. (R. 192: Tab 1:3, 5.)
Judge Lewis then ordered a supplemental evidentiary hearing in the case; she claimed she
needed to assess the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified. (R. 192: Tab 1:4.)
Judge Lewis essentially rejected the "Stipulated Facts" as part of the record. That ruling
was incorrect for several reasons.
First, Judge Lewis had a complete record of the preliminary hearing. She was not
at liberty to reject the "Stipulated Facts." "Ordinarily, courts are bound by stipulations
between parties." First of Denver Mtg. Investors. 600 P.2d at 527. A court may not set
aside a stipulation unless a proper motion is made by one of the parties showing
inadvertence or justifiable cause. See Yeargin. Inc.. 2001 UT 11, ^[21.
In this case, the "Stipulated Facts" were signed by both the prosecutor and counsel
for the defendant. "It is unlikely that a stipulation signed by counsel and filed with the
court was entered into inadvertently." Dove, 710 P.2d at 171. Thus, the "Stipulated
Facts" signed by both attorneys was binding on the court and the parties. See id. The
"Stipulated Facts" completed the record for the preliminary hearing. Where Judge Lewis
had a complete record, she should have ruled on the Motion to Quash,,
Second, Judge Lewis ordered the supplemental hearing so that she could assess
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the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses. That was improper. The bindover
standard requires the judge to consider the facts and inferences presented at the
preliminary hearing in the light most favorable to the state. Hawatmeh. 2001 UT 51, ^3.
The judge may not make credibility determinations since those determinations must be
left '"to the fact finder at trial.'" Clark, 2001 UT 9,1J10 (cite omitted). Judge Lewis was
not required to make credibility determinations. Her role was limited to assessing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, %3.
Also, a motion to quash raises a question of jurisdiction in the district court. In
considering a motion to quash, the district court judge has the authority "and the
obligation to determine whether its original jurisdiction has been properly invoked."
Humphrey, 823 P.2d at 465-66. Such a determination concerns a review of the preliminary hearing proceedings. Id at 466. Logically, if the evidence fails to support the
bindover, the district court lacks jurisdiction to proceed with the matter and must dismiss
the case.
In that regard, Judge Lewis' authority in this case encompassed review only of the
procedure by which the matter came before the district court. Humphrey, 823 P.2d at
466. If the evidence failed to support the bindover, the district court lacked jurisdiction
to proceed with the case. If the district court's jurisdiction was not properly invoked, the
district court would not have jurisdiction to take any additional evidence that the state
wished to present in supplemental proceedings. Thus, the trial court's order for
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supplemental proceedings was in error.
Third, the law does not allow for supplemental evidentiary proceedings as ordered
in this case. Specifically, Rule 7(h)(1) requires preliminary hearings to be held "under
the rules and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The state has the
burden of proof and shall proceed first with its case." Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(1) (2002).
At the conclusion of the state's case, the defendant may testify or present witnesses. Id.
The rules do not provide for additional, supplemental evidentiary proceedings.
Thereafter, iffromthe evidence the judgefindsprobable cause, the case shall
proceed to trial. Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(2) (2002). If the judge does not find probable
cause "to believe that the crime charged has been committed or that the defendant
committed it, the magistrate," or the trial judge reviewing the motion to quash
(Humphrey, 823 P.2d at 465-466), "shall dismiss the information and discharge the
defendant." Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(3) (emphasis added). The language of Rule 7(h)(3) is
mandatory. The rules do not provide for supplemental evidentiary proceedings.
Once the case is dismissed, the prosecutor has the discretion to institute a
"subsequent prosecution" for the same offense. Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(3). However, the
prosecutor's discretion is limited. The prosecutor may not institute a subsequent
prosecution unless s/he is able to "showr that new or previously unavailable evidence has
surfaced or that other good cause justifies refiling." Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647.
The "Brickev" standard provides protection against prosecutorial abuse and it
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ensures due process. "[D]ue process considerations prohibit a prosecutor from refiling
criminal charges earlier dismissed for insufficient evidence" unless the prosecutor can
justify the filing and the additional proceedings under the "Brickey" standard. Idj
see also State v. Morgan. 2001 UT 87,ffl[14-15,34 P.3d 767 (if the state intentionally
withholds evidence, that is not good cause for a new preliminary hearing); State v. Redd.
2001 UT 113,1fl[16-17, 20, 37 P.3d 1160 (where the state fails to present "a scintilla of
evidence" on one of the elements of the crime, refiling in that instance presumptively
violates the due process rights of defendant).
In the instant case, Judge Lewis ordered a supplemental evidentiary hearing that
allowed the state to present whatever evidence it wished. (R. 192: Tab 1:3-4; 163 (ruling
that the state may present any live testimony it "would like to present").) Such an order
without limitation is unlawful. See Redd, 2001 UT 113, ^[13 (due process precludes
additional proceedings '"without limitation" in the preliminary-hearing stage). Here, the
trial court did not limit the supplemental evidentiary hearing to evidence that was
presented at the original proceedings but not recorded. In addition, the judge did not
limit the supplemental evidentiary hearing to permit the state to present previously
unavailable evidence, as permitted under Brickey. 714 P.2d at 647.
In this case, the judge effectively circumvented the "Brickey" standard by entering
an order to allow the prosecutor to present any additional evidence s/he wished in the
matter. Such an order disregards the checks and balances on the system that ensure
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fundamental fairness and due process. See Morgan, 2001 UT 87,fflfl1-13 (the "Brickev"
standard ensures the proper balance, where the state may present new or additional evidence in connection with the preliminary hearing only in limited circumstances). Considerations of fundamental fairness preclude providing the prosecutor with such unbridled
discretion in subsequent proceedings at the preliminary-hearing stage. See Brickey. 714
P.2d at 647. In that regard, Judge Lewis' ruling in this case violated Brickev.
The trial court's order of January 16, 2002, in part was improper. The trial court
ruled the preliminary-hearing record was "incomplete" and it ordered an evidentiary
hearing to supplement the preliminary-hearing transcript. That was error. The trial court
had a complete record on the matter. The trial court should have ruled on the Motion to
Quash based on the preliminary hearing transcript and the "Stipulated Facts."
Harris respectfully requests that this Court enter an order vacating that portion of
the trial court's order providing for the supplemental, evidentiary proceedings. Also,
Harris respectfully requests that this Court direct the trial court to rule on the Motion to
Quash based on the transcript of the existing preliminary hearing and the "Stipulated
Facts." In the event the trial court determines on the record before it that the evidence is
sufficient for a bindover, it may proceed to trial with the matter. If there is insufficient
evidence before the court to support the bindover order, the trial court must dismiss the
case. Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(3). If the case is dismissed, the prosecutor may have the
opportunity to refile the charges under the proper "Brickev" standard and the rules.
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C. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE BINDOVER.
The trial court should decide the Motion to Quash in the first instance on the
"Stipulated Facts" and the preliminary hearing transcript, as set forth above. "[I]t is
always proper for a trial court, as a threshold jurisdictional matter, to consider whether it
has jurisdiction over a criminal defendant." Humphrey, 823 P.2d at 468. This Court
simply should reverse the trial court's order as requested above, and remand this case "to
the district court[] for consideration of the merits of the motion[] to quash." IcL
In the event this Court considers it necessary to address the merits of the Motion
to Quash, it should find that the state's evidence here was insufficient to support the
bindover, as further explained below.
1. Utah's Theft Provisions.
The state charged Harris with theft. The Utah Code defines the crime of theft as
follows: "A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the
property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404
(1999). The Code also defines relevant phrases as follow:
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object:
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or to use under
such circumstances that a substantial portion of its economic value, or of the use
and benefit thereof, would be lost; or
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other compensation;
or
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(c) To dispose of the property under circumstances that make it unlikely that the
owner will recover it.
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is nol necessarily limited
to, conduct heretofore defined or known as common-law larceny by trespassory
taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee, and embezzlement.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401 (1973 & 1999); see also State v. Shonka. 279 P.2d 711,713
(Utah 1955) (identifying elements of larceny as follows: "(I) taking and (2) carrying
away of the (3) personal property [] (4) of another (5) by trespass without the owner's
consent (6) with the intent to steal"); State v. Aures, 127 P.2d 872 (Utah 1942)
(identifying embezzlement asfraudulentconversion of property by one who is entrusted
as "'bailee, tenant or lodger, or with any power of attorney,'" where such person
converted property to his own use); Black's Law Dictionary 540 (7th ed. 1999) (defining
common law embezzlement asfraudulenttaking of property by one who is a fiduciary).
The Utah consolidated theft statute also is relevant here. It states the following:
Conduct denominated theft in this part constitutes a single offense embracing the
separate offenses such as those heretofore known as larceny, larceny by trick,
larceny by bailees, embezzlement, false pretense, extortion, blackmail, receiving
stolen property. An accusation of theft may be supported by evidence that it was
committed in any manner specified in Sections 76-6-404 through 76- 6-410,
subject to the power of the court to ensure a fair trial by granting a continuance or
other appropriate relief where the conduct of the defense would be prejudiced by
lack of fair notice or by surprise.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-403 (1999).
In construing the various theft provisions set forth above, this Court has
recognized that "the consolidated theft statute is designed to 4eliminate[] the distinctions
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and technicalities previously existing, recognizing one crime of theft and incorporating
therein all crimes involving the taking or obtaining of personal property without force.'"
State v. Bush. 2001 UT App 10, ^[12,47 P.3d 69 (citing State v. Tavlor. 570 P.2d 697,
698 (Utah 1977)).
This Court also has stated that the purpose of the consolidated theft statute "is not
to allow the State to avoid the substantive safeguards contained in Rule 4 [for sufficient
pleading by information]. Rather, the consolidated theft statute is designed to prevent a
defendant from escaping an otherwise valid theft charge on a mere technicality in the
pleadings." Bush. 2001 UT App 10, TJ15.
To that end, the state may allege general theft and then refine its theory for a
specific variation of theft if it turns out that the evidence supports such a variation.
See id. at ^[15-16. This Court stated the following with regard to the general theft
provision and the alternative theories:
If it turns out, as is the case here, that the State's initial theory of theft is not
supported by the evidence and a different theory is warranted, the State should not
be foreclosed from changing the theory of theft simply because it attempted to
provide more information in the initial charge. The purpose of the consolidated
theft statute is to allow the State to change its theory of the crime when it later
determines the evidence supports a different theory. In so holding, however, we
reiterate that allowing the State to amend the charge is always subject to a
defendant's right to fair notice.
Bush,2001UT App 10,1(23.
The state's ability to amend the information to reflect a specific or an alternative
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theft theory is subject to defendant's right to know the nature of the accusation so that
defendant is able to prepare a defense. IdL atffi|16,23-24. That means, if the state alleges
general theft and has not indicated at the preliminary hearing its intent to pursue a specific
theory, the defendant may not be on notice of the nature of the accusation against him to
allow him the "opportunity to assail the sufficiency of the complaint." Id. at ^[27. If the
state later discloses its specific theory for the offense, the defendant may be entitled to a
new preliminary hearing in order to engage in a meaningful cross-examination as it
relates to the state's specific theory. Bush, 2001 UT 10, ^J28 ("defendant is entitled to the
opportunity to cross-examine the State's witnesses [anew] with respect to the new
[amended] charge").
In this case, the state charged Harris with general theft under Section 76-6-404.
(R. 2-4.) During the preliminary hearing, the state did not suggest that it would amend
the charge to allege any different or specific theory of the crime under the law. (R. 191.)
Indeed, the prosecutor argued that "we have shown probable cause to believe that the
defendant has committed the crime of theft. A person commits [theft] under the Code of
the crime of theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control of the property of
another with the purpose to deprive him thereof." (R. 191:24-25.) The state then argued
that the evidence supported general theft. (Id.)
Counsel for Harris disagreed with the state. "It's not unauthorized control. It's not
theft." (R. 191:26.) Defense counsel then claimed that the state arguably may have a
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stronger case for the specific variation of "theft by deception." (R. 191:26.) Yet, as
defense counsel argued at the preliminary hearing, the state did not charge that specific
variation. (Id.) In addition, the evidence presented in this matter would not support a
charge either for general theft or the specific variation of theft by deception. (See R. 191,
generally; see also 192: Tab 1:2 (defense counsel consistently argued that the state failed
to present sufficient evidence to support a crime).)
Thereafter, in papers filed with Judge Lewis, the state argued the evidence supported the specific variation of "theft by deception." (R. 117.) Under the Code, the
crime of theft by deception is defined as follows:
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of
another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as to
matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements unlikely to
deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. "Puffing" means an exaggerated
commendation of wares or worth in communications addressed to the public or to
a class or group.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1999). Significantly, the state did not seek to have the information amended to support that alternative theory. See Bush. 2001 UT App 10, THJ2729 (state's request to amend information is subject to defendant's right to fair notice,
which may include a new preliminary hearing).
Even if the state had requested an amendment for theft by deception, as further set
forth below, the state's evidence in this case was insufficient to support either the general
crime of "theft," or the specific variation of "theft by deception."
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2. The Evidence Failed to Support Either Theft or Theft by Deception.
As stated above, the general crime of "theft" and the more specific crime of "theft
by deception," both require the state to establish the following elements at the preliminary
hearing: that the defendant [1] obtained or exercised control, [2] over the property of
another, [3] with a purpose to deprive him thereof. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 (theft
also requires proof of "unauthorized control"); 76-6-405 (theft by deception also requires
proof of deception). In this case, the state failed to show that Harris exercised control
"over the property of another with the purpose to deprive him thereof." The state also
failed to establish "unauthorized control" for theft; and "deception" for the specific
variation.
Specifically, the evidence considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution
supports that the Praags and Harris entered into a contract, wherein Harris agreed to build
cabinets with "melamine and cherry wood interiors" and other features for installation in
the Praags' home, and the Praags agreed to pay the amount of $14,100. The contract
provided that the Praags were to pay 50% of the price at the time of the contract, 25% of
the price on delivery of the cabinets, and the balance upon completion of the project.
(See R. 191:14-15, Exhibit 1 (Contract, dated May 3,2000).) Harris and the Praags
signed the contract. Although the "contract" did not specify the date of performance
(see id), Mrs. Praag testified that the work was to be completed by July 21,2000. (R.
191:3.) The contract also provided that Harris would pay a "$50 late penalty after 21" if
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Harris was late in performing on the contract and it delayed in the closing on the Praags'
home. (R. 191:14-15, Exhibit 1; 61-62 ("Stipulated Facts").)
Thereafter, the Praags did not provide Harris with the down payment until May 10,
2000. On that date, the Praags' general contractor prepared a check made payable to
Harris in the amount of $7,000. (R. 191:10.) The general contractor asked Harris to hold
on to the check until "the actual funds were transferred" to the Praags' account, which
was on May 15. (R. 191:11.) Harris deposited the check on May 15. (Id.)
On or about May 17, Mrs. Praag began to have concerns about Harris' ability to
perform on the contract. (R. 191:4, 10 (the Praags' contractor gave a check to Harris on
May 10; a week later the Praags had concerns).) The Praags contacted Harris and he
assured them that he would do the work. (R. 191:4-5.) This did not allay Mrs. Praags'
concerns. (R. 191:5.) Harris also said he was one-third of the way finished. (Id.)
On July 13, before Harris was due to perform on the contract, the Praags contacted
him again. This time, Harris admitted "that he actually really hadn't started our cabinets."
He also admitted that he had spent the $7,000 down payment. (R. 191:6.)
At that point, the Praags decided to terminate the contract with Harris. They had a
letter prepared demanding that Harris "repay" the down payment by July 21. (R. 191:7,
11-12; Exhibit 2.) Harris informed the Praags that he was unable to pay the money by
that date. (R. 191:7.) He requested more time, and the Praags "extend[ed] that until
August 18th." (R. 191:7.) Harris signed the Praags'letter terminating the contract. (R.
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191:7, 11-12; Exhibit 2.) According to the "Stipulated Facts," Harris "did not pay the
Praags the $7,000 he had agreed to refund." (R. 61.)
The facts fail to establish the general crime of theft. The evidence fails to support
that Harris obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the down payment. By way
of explanation, the May 3 contract required Harris to build and install cabinets for the
Praags' home and it required the Praags to pay 50% of the contract price. The Praags'
contractor made the down payment on May 10, and then asked Harris not to deposit the
funds until she gave him authorization. Harris complied with the request. He did not
deposit the check until he was specifically authorized to do so. On May 15, the
contractor gave Harris permission to cash the check. The evidence is undisputed. It
supports that Harris was authorized to cash the check. He obtained authorized control
over the funds.
Next, the contract did not specify how Harris was required to use the funds. It did
not obligate Harris to use the funds only on materials for and services provided in
connection with the Praags'cabinets. (See R. 191:14-15, Exhibit 1.) Likewise, the
Praags did not testify that they had any expectation that the funds would be used in such
an exclusive fashion. (See R. 191, in general.)
Indeed, in this case, the contract reflects no such expectation on the Praags' part.
While the Praags agreed to provide a down payment (see R. 191:14-15, Exhibit 1), Harris
then was required to build and deliver all cabinets before the Praags would be required to
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pay anything further. (Id.) Harris would be finally paid for the project after he
completed installation of the cabinets. (Id) The arrangement recognized that Harris used
money as it came in for various projects. Also, in this case, the state failed to show that
the Praags placed any restrictions or limitations on the use of the down payment. Thus,
the state failed to present any evidence to support that Harris exercised unauthorized
control over the property of another. See State v. Burton, 800 P.2d 817, 819 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990) (since the terms of the contract did not create an express duty as to how
defendant should use the funds, the state could not establish theft).
In this case, the state was unable to show that Harris "obtain[ed] or exercis[ed]
unauthorized control" over the down payment. The evidence failed to support theft.
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404.
Next, under the specific variation of theft by deception, the evidence considered in
the light most favorable to the prosecution fails to establish any deception on Harris'
part. The Utah Code specifies that "failure to perform the promise in issue without other
evidence of intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof'that the actor did not intend to
perform or knew the promise would not be performed." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6401(5)(e) (1999) (emphasis added). That is, the state must establish something more
than breach of contract.
Here, Harris entered into the contract with the Praags on May 3. The Praags
delayed in making any down payment to Harris until funds cleared their account on May
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15. (R. 191:10-11, 14-15, Exhibit 1.) The state failed to present any evidence of criminal
intent or knowledge on Harris' part where the initial contract was concerned. That is,
there is no evidence to support that Harris made a false or untrue statement in order to
affect the judgment of the Praags in entering into the contract or making the down
payment. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(5).
Thereafter, the Praags became concerned with Harris' ability to perform on the
contract. On or about May 17, Mrs. Praag contacted him and expressed her concern.
Harris told Mrs. Praag that he had started the work on the cabinets. (R. 191:4-5.) Mrs.
Praag testified that Harris's statements did not address her concerns. (R. 191:5.) She
was skeptical about his ability to perform the work. (R. 191:5.) On July 13, Mrs. Praag
confronted Harris again. This time, he admitted "he actually really hadn't started our
cabinets." (R. 191:6.) Also, he told Mis. Praag, "I've spent the money." (R. 191:6.)
On July 14, the Praags terminated the contract. The work on the contract was not
completed by July 21 (see R. 191:3-4 (Mrs. Praag testified that Harris failed to complete
the work by July 21)) because the Praags canceled the contract prior to the due date. (R.
191:7-8.) The Praags' conduct affected the transaction and released Harris from
performing as scheduled.
Those facts do not support that Harris was deceptive. There is no evidence that
Harris entered into the contract or accepted the money promising to perform when he did
not intend to perform; there is no evidence that he provided a false impression that
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affected the Praags' judgment in entering the contract; and there is no evidence that
Harris promised performance with criminal intent. In this case, the state simply
demonstrated that Harris "fail[ed] to perform the promise in issue." Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-40 l(5)(e).
Indeed, even if this Court were to find that Harris' statement to Mrs. Praag on or
about May 17 misrepresented the situation about the cabinets (R. 191:4-6 (Mrs. Praag
testified that Harris told her on about May 17 that he had started the cabinets; then he
told her on July 13 that "he actually really hadn't started our cabinets")), Mrs. Praag
admitted that Harris' statements did not alleviate her concerns. She felt he "basically
blew it off." (R. 191:5.) Thus, the state cannot show that the alleged misrepresentation
somehow "affect[ed] the judgment" of the Praags in the matter. See Utah Code Ann. §§
76-6-40l(5)(a) and 76-6-405(2). Also, as Mrs. Praag admitted, on July 13, Harris
"corrected]" any false impression that Mrs. Praag may have had about his work on the
project. He told her he had not started the project. (R. 191:6); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6401(5)(b).2

2 In the event the state's evidence also established that Harris made misrepresentations to
the officer in October about his work on the cabinets, those misrepresentations are irrelevant, since the Praags did not rely on them in this case and the statements did not affect
the Praags' judgment in the matter. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(5) (for "deception"
to be criminal, it must "affect the judgment" of the other party to the transaction); see
also id. at § 76-6-405(2) (recognizing that a falsity that has no pecuniary significance
does not constitute "deception"). At the time Harris made the representation, the Praags
had already terminated the original contract prior to the performance date.
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In the end, the state failed to present "other evidence" to support deceptive "intent
or knowledge" as required under the specific variation of theft by deception. See Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-40 l(5)(e). Under Utah law, a simple breach of performance will not
support criminal conduct. Id.
In analogous cases, other courts have found that breach of contract does not give
rise to criminal conduct. In State v. Amanns. 2 S.W. 3d 241 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999),
defendant was convicted of theft for failing to relinquish a down payment on a
construction contract after the homeowner terminated the contract with defendant. The
court described the facts as follows:
The material facts of this case are not in dispute. In early July, 1994, the
appellant, a contractor, entered into a written contract with Ms. Otey Sue
Reynolds to remodel the basement of her home. The agreed contract price was
$16,000. The terms provided that the appellant would be paid an initial amount
of $6,000, a second payment after the project was fifty percent complete, and the
balance due upon completion. On July 21, 1994, Ms. Reynolds paid the appellant
$6,000 by check. The following day, the appellant cashed the $6,000 check. On
this same day, he deposited the sum of $1,760.57 with 84 Lumber Company in
Knoxville for the purchase of estimated materials to be used in the remodeling
project. The appellant advised 84 Lumber that these materials were being
purchased for improvements to Ms. Reynolds1 house. The proof established that
the appellant was under no contractual obligation to establish any such account.
Moreover, Ms. Reynolds had no possessory interest in the funds in the account.
The appellant began work on August 1, 1994. The first day involved only the
unloading of some materials. The following day, he returned to Ms. Reynolds1
home around 10:00 a.m. and worked until 3:50 p.m. for a period of approximately
six hours. Upon the appellant's arrival at the Reynolds home the third day, Ms.
Reynolds was obviously displeased with the quality of workmanship and advised
the appellant, "I can't have work like this in my house." The appellant testified
that he was told by Ms. Reynolds, ffI don't like your work at all. I don't want you
to work here no more." Following the exchange, the appellant loaded his tools
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and materials and left. No further work was performed. Ms. Reynolds testified
that she attempted to contact the appellant by phone that day by leaving a message
on his recorder. Within the next two days, Ms. Reynolds called her attorney
about the matter. Approximately two days later, the appellant received a letter
from Ms. Reynolds1 attorney advising him that he was to have no further contact
with Ms. Reynolds. At the appellant's request on August 5, 1994, 84 Lumber
issued a check in the sum of $1,494.50, representing the balance of his deposit for
the Reynolds job.
Amanns. 2 S.W.3d at 242-43. The appellant/defendant did not refund the money to the
homeowner. Id.
After atrial, the defendant was convicted of general theft. LdLat242. He
appealed from the conviction. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that the
facts could not support the conviction. "It is undisputed that the appellant lawfully
obtained possession of the $6,000 at which time Ms. Reynolds relinquished all of her
interest in the money. Moreover, the record is void of any proof that the appellant took
possession of the $6,000 with the intent to convert the money to his own use." Id. at 245.
While the defendant failed to return a portion of the down payment, "these facts establish
a breach of contract, they fall far short of establishing, beyond a reasonable doubt, any
intent to defraud." Id.
Also, in Cox v. State. 658 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983), the defendant was
convicted of theft for breach of contract on a kitchen remodel. The appellate court
reversed the conviction. IcL
The facts in Cox reflected the following: Complainant purchased a house which
needed repairs. Defendant did some of the repairs and was paid. The complainant then
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identified work in the kitchen that needed to be done, including the purchase and
installation of a stove, oven, range top, and venting hood. Id. at 669-70. Appellant
agreed to do the work for $600.00. After defendant was paid, he purchased the oven but
did not connect it. Complainant also asked the defendant to install a sink she had
purchased from Sears and to install countertops. IdL. Defendant requested additional
money for that project, which complainant paid. Defendant also offered to pick the sink
up from Sears, and complainant gave him the receipt for it. Although defendant
promised to do the work that evening, he did not return for two days. IcL
When complainant ultimately confronted defendant later, he had the sink and
promised to do the work. Again he failed to do so. IjLat 670. For several days
thereafter, complainant was unable to reach the defendant. When shefinallywas able to
talk to him, he refused to explain why he would notfinishthe job, deliver the appliances
or return the money. The defendant never reimbursed complainant and he was
ultimately charged and convicted of theft. IdL. at 669-70.
On appeal, the court ruled that the state's evidence failed to establish a false
representation, and that the case "established no more than a dispute over appellant's
performance of a kitchen remodeling contract." Id. at 671. "The mere fact that one fails
to return or pay back money after failing to perform a contract, for the performance of
which the money was paid in advance, does not constitute theft." Id.
In this case, there is no way to know to what extent Harris was able to perform on
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the contract by July 21, since the Praags terminated the contract with Harris before that
date. Also, according to the evidence, on the day the Praags entered into the contract
with Harris, they specifically acknowledged the possibility that he would not be able to
perform by July 21. The Praags signed the contract, which included a "$50 late penalty
after [July] 21" if Harris was late on the project and it delayed closing on the Praags'
home. (R. 191:14-15, Exhibit 1; 61-62.) The Praags' recognized at the time of the
contract that performance may be late. Thereafter, the Praags canceled the contract
before Harris was required to perform.
Under the law, the Praags may have a civil claim against Harris for breach of
contract or unjust enrichment. Indeed, under Utah law, a civil claim for unjust
enrichment requires proof of three factors:
First, there must be a benefit conferred on one person by another. [See Berrett v.
Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, 557 (Utah 1984).] Second, the conferee must appreciate or
have knowledge of the benefit. See. kL Finally, there must be "the acceptance or
retention by the conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it
inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value."
Id. The plaintiff must prove all three elements to sustain a claim of unjust
enrichment.
Desert Mariah. Inc. v. B & L Auto, Inc.. 2000 UT 83, f 13, 12 P.3d 580. The claims in
Harris' case may be more properly pursued in civil court.
Without additional evidence, the state is unable to establish unauthorized control
for a general theft charge. The undisputed facts support that the Praags authorized the
down payment to Harris, and they did not place any limitations on his use of the money.
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In addition, the state's evidence fails to support deception. The evidence fails to
establish that Harris made any misrepresentation to the Praags in connection with
entering into the contract or making the down payment. There is no "other evidence of
intent or knowledge" for deception as required by statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6401(5)(e).3 On that basis, the Motion to Quash should have been granted.
3. The State Is Precluded From Arguing Any Other Theory for Theft Here. Since
Any Other Alternative Theory Has Not Been Presented Below Through the Proper
Channels. Also, Alternative Theories Would Implicate the Law Set Forth in Bush.
The state did not indicate in the court below that it intended to pursue any other
theory of theft against Harris. (See record generally.) In the event the state intended to
proceed with an alternative specific theory it was required to file a request to amend the
information. See Bush, 2001 UT App 10. Since the state did not file such a request
below, it is not necessary at this juncture for the parties to demonstrate whether the
evidence supports any other specific theory of theft. Indeed, any other alternative theory
should be pursued through the proper channels in the lower court. If the state is able to
present any other theory, even on the record as it exists, Harris may be entitled to crossexamine the witnesses anew in light of the amended charge. See Bush, 2001 UT App 10,
3 In the event the state tries to claim that the criminal conduct occurred when Harris
signed the July 14 letter requiring him to repay the down payment, that conduct likewise
does not rise to a criminal level. The letter essentially acknowledges that the Praags
initially relinquished control of the $7,000 to Harris, and they demanded that Harris repay
the money. The Praags had the letter drawn up by their attorney and it included their
language. There is no evidence that Harris made any representations to support a claim of
"deception" there.
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ffi[27-29; supra, subpoint C.I., herein.
Indeed, it is not necessary for this Court to determine sufficiency of the evidence
for the bindover. The question here is whether the trial court had a complete record of the
preliminary hearing to decide the Motion to Quash. The trial court was not at liberty to
disregard the "Stipulated Facts," and order an additional evidentiary hearing to
supplement the preliminary hearing, where the state would be entitled to present whatever
evidence it wished. The law does not permit such proceedings. This Court should
reverse the trial court's order in that regard.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Harris respectfully requests that this Court enter
an order vacating that portion of the trial court's January 16 order providing for further
evidentiary proceedings. Also, Harris respectfully requests that this Court direct the trial
court to rule on the Motion to Quash based on the transcript of the existing preliminary
hearing and the "Stipulated Facts."
SUBMITTED this f£_day of

^cyjt^^L.^

, 2002.
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LINDA M. JONES
STEPHEN HOWARD"
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
Counsel for the Appellant/Defendant

37

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, LiNbA At CONGS , hereby certify that I have caused to be hand delivered an
original and 1

copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State,

5th Floor, 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 and _H_ copies to the Attorney
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day of
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 001919065

JEFF RAY HARRIS,

Hon. Leslie A. Lewis

Defendant.
Defendant's argument on the defendant's Motion to Quash the Bindover was heard on
November 28, 2001. The transcript of the Preliminary Hearing was provided, however, it is
incomplete due to technical difficulties during the hearing. The State and the defendant have
stipulated to the testimony which was absent from the transcript, and provided that stipulation to
the Court. The Court is not satisfied that the evidence presented supports the bindover, and will
hear the live testimony which was not recorded in the transcript, along with any other live
testimony the State would like to present. The Court will rely on the live testimony presented
and the transcript from the Preliminary Hearing. The case will not be remanded to Judge
Lindberg.
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DATED this.ilth-day of Deeember^Oak BYTK^COURT:
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LESLIE A. LEWIS, District Judge

I

ORDER
Case No. 001919065
Page 2
Approved as to form:

Stephen W. Howard

ORDER
Case No. 001919065
Page 3
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was delivered to
Stephen W. Howard, Attorney for Defendant Jeff Ray Harris, at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the

day of December, 2001.

ADDENDUM B

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

APR 2 9 2002
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

PautetteStagg
Ctefk of the Court

00O00

State of Utah,
ORDER
Respondent,
Case No. 20020085-CA
v.
Jeff Ray Harris
Petitioner.

Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Orme.
This matter is before the court on a petition for permission
to appeal from an interlocutory order filed pursuant to Rule 5 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for permission to
appeal is granted.
DATED this

of April, 2002.

FOR THE COURT:

Q
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aL.

udge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of April, 2002, a true and
correct copy of the attached Order was deposited in the United
States mail to:
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR.
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854
STEPHEN W. HOWARD
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 E 500 S STE 300
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
and a true and correct copy of the attached ORDER was deposited
in the United States mail to the judge listed below:
HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 1860
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860
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TRIAL COURT: THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 001919065
APPEALS CASE NO.: 20020085-CA

ADDENDUM C

UTAH RCLKS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 7. Proceedings before magistrate.
(a) When a summons is issued in lieu of a warrant of arrest, the defendant
shall appear before the court as directed in the summons.
(b) When any peace officer (>v 01 her person makes an arrest with or without
a warrant, the person arrested shall be taken to the nearest available
magistrate for setting of bail. If an information has not been filed, one shall be
filed without delay before the magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense.
(c)(1) If a person is arrested in a county other than where the offense was
committed the person arrested shall without unnecessary delay be returned to
the county where the crime was committed and shall he taken before the
proper magistrate under these rules.
(2) If for any reason the person arrested cannot be promptly returned to the
county and the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor for which a
voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as a conviction under Subsection
77-7-21(1), the person arrested may state in writing a desire to forfeit bail,
waive trial in the district in which the information is pending, and consent to
disposition of the case in the county in which the person was arrested, is held,
or is present.
(3) Upon receipt of the defendant's statement, the clerk of the court in which
the information is pending shall transmit the papers in the proceeding or
copies of them to the clerk of the court for the county in which the defendant
is arrested, held, or present. The prosecution shall continue in that county.
(4) Forfeited bail shall be returned to the jurisdiction that issued the
warrant.
(5) If the defendant is charged with an offense other than a misdemeanor for
which a voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as a conviction under
Subsection 77-7-21(1), the defendant shall be taken without unnecessary delay
before a magistrate within the county of arrest for the determination of bail
under Section 77-20-1 and released on bail or held without bail under Section
77-20-1.
(6) Bail shall be returned to the magistrate having jurisdiction over the
offense, with the record made of the proceedings before the magistrate.
(d) The magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense charged shall, upon
the defendant's first appearance, infoim the defendant:
(1) of the charge in the information or indictment and furnish a copy;
(2) of any affidavit or recorded testimony given in support of the information
and how to obtain them;
(3) of the right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed by the court
without expense if unable to obtain counsel;
(4) of rights concerning pretrial release, including bail; and
(5) that the defendant is not required to make any statement, and that the
statements the defendant does make may be used against the defendant in a
court of law.
(e) The magistrate shall, after providing the information under paragraph
(d> and before proceeding further, allow the defendant reasonable time and
opportunity to consult counsel and shall allow the defendant to contact any
attorney by any reasonable means, without delay and without fee.
(f) If the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor, the magistrate
shall call upon the defendant to enter a plea.
(1) If the plea is guilty, the defendant shall be sentenced by the magistrate
as provided by law7.
(2) If the plea is not guilty, a trial date shall be set. The date may not be
extended except for good cause shown. Trial shall be held under these rules
and law applicable to criminal cases
(g)(1) If a defendant is charged with a felony, the defendant shall be advised
of the right to a preliminary examination. If the defendant waives the right to
a preliminary examination, and the prosecuting attorney consents, the magistrate shall order the defendant bound over to answer in the district court.

(2) If ihe defendant does not waive a preliminary examination, the magistrate shall schedule the preliminary examination. The examination shall be
held within a reasonable time, but n<<! later than ten days if the defendant is
in custody for the offense charged and not later than 30 days if the defendant
is not in custodv These time periods may be extended by the magistrate for
good cause shown. A preliminary, examination may not be held if the defendant
is indicted.
(h)(l) Unless otherwise provided, a preliminary examination shall be held
under the rules and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The
state has the burden of proof and shall proceed first with its case. At the
conclusion of the state's case, the defendant may testify under oath, call
witnesses, and present evidence The defendant may also cross-examine
adverse witnesses.
(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe that the
crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it,
the magistrate shall order, in writing, that the defendant be bound over to
answer in the district court. The findings of probable cause may be based on
hearsay in whole or in part. Objections to evidence on the ground t h a t it was
acquired by unlawful means are not properly raised at the preliminary
examination.
(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the crime
charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it, the magistrate shall dismiss the information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal.
The dismissal and discharge do not preclude the state from instituting a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
(i) At a preliminary examination, the magistrate, upon request of either
party, may exclude witnesses from the courtroom and may require witnesses
not to converse with each other until the preliminary examination is concluded. On the request of either party, the magistrate may order all spectators
to be excluded from the courtroom.
(j)(l) If the magistrate oiders the defendant bound over to the district court,
the magistrate shall execute in writing a bind-over order and shall transmit to
the clerk of the district court all pleadings in and records made of the
proceedings before the magistrate, including exhibits, recordings, and any
typewritten transcript.
(2) When a magistrate commits a defendant to the custody of the sheriff, the
magistrate shall execute the appropriate commitment order.
(k)d^ When a magistrate has good cause to believe that any material
witness in a pending case will not appear and testify unless bond is required,
the magistrate may fix a bond with or without sureties and in a sum considered
adequate for the appearance of the witness.
(2) If the witness fails or refuses to post the bond with the clerk of the court,
the magistrate may commit the witness to jail until the witness complies or is
otherwise legally discharged.
(3) If the witness does provide bond when required, the witness may be
examined and cross-examined before the magistrate in the presence of the
defendant and the testimony shall be recorded. The witness shall then be
discharged.
(4) If the witness is unavailable or fails to appear at any subsequent hearing
or trial when ordered to do t»o, the recorded testimony may be used at the
hearing or trial in lieu of the personal testimonv of the witness.
(Amended effective May 1. 1993; November 1, 1996; April 29, 1998; April 1,
1999.)

UTAH CRIMINAL CODE

76-6-401.

Definitions.

For the purposes of this part:
(1) "Property'' means anything of value, including real estate, tangible
and intangible personal property, captured or domestic animals and birds,
written instruments or other writings representing or embodying rights
concerning real or personal property, labor, services, or otherwise containing anything of value to the owner, commodities of a public utility nature
such as telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and trade
secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any scientific or technical
information, design, process, procedure, formula or invention which the
owner thereof intends to be available only to persons selected by him.
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a transfer of
possession or of some other legally recognized interest in property,
whether to the obtainer or another; in relation to labor or services, to
secure performance thereof; and in relation to a trade secret, to make any
facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction.
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object:
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or
to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other
compensation; or
(c) To dispose of the property under circumstances that make it
unlikely that the owner will recover it.
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is not necessarily limited to, conduct heretofore defined or known as common-law
larceny by trespassory taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee,
and embezzlement.
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally:
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or
fact that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that
is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact that the actor
previously created or confirmed by words or conduct that is likely to
affect the judgment of another and that the actor does not now believe
to be true; or
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information likely to affect his
judgment in the transaction; or
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property without
disclosing a lien, security interest, adverse claim, or other legal
impediment to the enjoyment of the property, whether the lien,
security interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid or is or is not
a matter of official record; or
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of
another in the transaction, which performance the actor does not
intend to perform or knows will not be performed; provided, however,
that failure to perform the promise in issue without other evidence of
intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof that the actor did not intend
to perform or knew the promise would not be performed.

76-6-403. Theft — Evidence to support accusation.
Conduct denominated theft in this part constitutes a single offense embracing the separate offenses such as those heretofore known as larceny, larceny by
trick, larceny by bailees, embezzlement, false pretense, extortion, blackmail,
receiving stolen property. An accusation of theft may be supported by evidence
that it was committed in any manner specified in Sections 76-6-404 through
76-6-410, subject to the power of the court to ensure a fair trial by granting a
continuance or other appropriate relief where the conduct of the defense would
be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or by surprise.

76-6-404. Theft — Elements.
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.

76-6-405. Theft by deception.
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of
another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as
to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements unlikely
to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. "Puffing" means an
exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in communications addressed to
the public or to a class or group.

